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The explanation for the positive relationship between concentration and profit-
ability is one of the most controversial topics in the field of industrial organization.
The interest in this topic is due primarily to the conflicting antitrust policy implica-
tions originating from two competing hypotheses: the market power (collusion) hy-
pothesis and the efficiency hypothesis. Tests of these hypotheses have focused, to a
large extent, on the determinants of incumbents’ profitability. The most widely used
test has been criticized for being insufficiently discriminating and, therefore, inappro-
priate for determining the validity of the hypotheses.
The current paper presents an alternative approach. It examines the competing
hypotheses by focusing on the behavior of potential entrants. A key premise is that
potential entrants respond differently to incumbents’ Ricardian rents and to incum-
bents’ monopoly rents. Ricardian rents, resulting from superior efficiency, should have
little impact on potential entrants, i.e., usually they do not induce entry; however,
monopoly rents, resulting from market power, should attract entry, ceteris paribus.
The current test is thus performed by comparing the entry response to adjusted
and unadjusted profitability measures. The adjusted measure is obtained by removing
the component of profitability attributable to concentration from the unadjusted mea-
sure. The removed component represents Ricardian rents, according to the efficiency
hypothesis, and monopoly rents, according to the market power hypothesis. These
differing interpretations result in contrasting predictions regarding the explanatory
power of the adjusted and unadjusted measures of profitability. The empirical frame-
work is based on a recursive model with a sample of U.S. oligopolistic industries.
Previewing the results, the findings are for the most part supportive of the market
power hypothesis.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been substantial debate on the correct interpretation of the positive
correlation characterizing the performance-concentration relationship. Proponents of
the market power hypothesis (MPH) argue that the positive relationship reflects higher
prices resulting from the exercise of market power.1 Proponents of the efficiency hy-20 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
pothesis (EH) claim that the positive relationship can be explained by the superior
efficiency of the largest firms in the industry. Enhanced profitability in concentrated
industries results from lower costs rather than higher prices [Demsetz,1974] and,
therefore, represents economic rents.
A common methodology for testing the hypotheses involves the use of a perfor-
mance equation, such as price-cost margins with concentration and firm market share
included among the explanatory variables.2 A positive and statistically significant coef-
ficient for market share and an insignificant or negative coefficient for concentration
represent evidence supportive of EH.3 This methodology has been criticized. Clarke,
Davis and Waterson [1984] find both theoretical and empirical flaws with this ap-
proach. Schmalensee’s [1987] tests lead him essentially to conclude that the findings
support none of the hypotheses. Salinger [1990] is of the opinion that the methodology
is flawed and fails to distinguish between the competing hypotheses. Stevens [1990]
points to a misspecification in the methodology resulting from the omission of an
interaction term between concentration and market share.4 Once an interaction term
is included, the results suggest that EH and MPH cannot be clearly separated. Fi-
nally, it should be noted that in addition to the market power and efficiency hypoth-
eses there are other explanations for the relationship between concentration and
profitability [Mancke,1974; Lippman and Rumelt,1982].5
MODEL
Ricardian rents result from unique factors owned or controlled by the firm. These
factors provide it with lower costs than those of competitive or marginally competitive
firms [Lindenberg and Ross, 1981] and can originate from a wide variety of inputs.6
Demsetz [1973) writes: “Such profits need not be eliminated soon by competition. It
may well be that superior competitive performance is unique to the firm, viewed as a
team, and unobtainable to others except by purchasing the firm itself. In this case the
return to superior performance is in the nature of a gain that is completely captured
by the owner of the firm, and not by its inputs. Here although the industry structure
may change because the superior firm grows, the resulting increase in profit cannot
easily serve to guide competition to similar success. ... It may be very difficult for
these firms to understand the reason for this difference in performance or to know
which inputs to attribute the performance of the successful firm.” Demsetz [1974]
adds: “All of this, of course, implies that existing large firms possess superior charac-
teristics that are difficult to imitate. Their method of organizing production, of provid-
ing service and of establishing buyer confidence must yield lower cost than can be
obtained by newer or smaller firms”.
The above statements suggest that market leaders’ superior efficiency rents are
not likely to attract entrants into the industry. That is not to say that such industries
will not experience entry. The entry that does take place, however, will be mostly due
to factors other than Ricardian rents. Potential entrants may invest in the develop-
ment of factors similar to those of the market leaders, assuming they can pinpoint the
rent yielding factor, but the uncertainty involved in this imitation process [Lippman
and Rumelt, 1982] raises the cost of entry considerably. Such factors are, according to21 RICARDIAN OR MONOPOLY RENTS?
Demsetz, essentially inimitable, at least for some time. Entry may take place because
of a new invention that results in a new product, a cost reducing process, or the
possession of some superior input. However such entry could occur in any industry
and would have yielded the entrant rents regardless of whether the current market
leaders are earning Ricardian rents or not.
Potential entrants are guided by incumbent firms’ profitability when calculating
their own expected profitability. It would be reasonable to assume that when perform-
ing such calculations, potential entrants tend to delete or disregard the Ricardian rent
component of incumbents’ profitability. Potential entrants usually cannot earn such
rents due to the inimitable nature of the factors involved. It would be misleading for
them to assume that incumbents’ returns inclusive of Ricardian rents are representa-
tive of their own expected post entry returns.
The current approach is based on the idea of subtracting from the performance
measure – price cost margins (PCM) — the component attributable to concentration.
That component could reflect either monopoly profits due to market power (MPH) or
else profits due to superior efficiency of market leaders (EH). If it is the former, then
the explanatory power of the adjusted PCM in the entry equation should be weaker
than that of the unadjusted PCM. If the removed component consists primarily of
profits due to superior efficiency then their removal should either have little impact
or else the adjusted PCM in the entry equation should provide improved explanatory
power.
 The current methodology, then, consists of a comparison of the effects of adjusted
and unadjusted PCM on entry. It should be noted that a positive coefficient for unad-
justed PCM in an entry equation is not, by itself, sufficient evidence for MPH unless
concentration is the sole source of above normal margins.7,8  Instead, the test has to
focus on the component of PCM attributable to concentration and its impact on entry.9
The model follows Masson and Shaanan [1982] except that the threshold concept
is used rather than entry forestalling profits. This empirical model was originally
utilized to test dynamic-stochastic limit pricing; however, as explained below, it is in
conformity with the rational entry deterrence models. It should be noted that despite
the association with entry deterrence and limit pricing, the empirical model does not
necessarily require firms to engage in limit pricing or in any other type of entry
deterrence behavior.10 In the deterrence models it is shown that in the presence of
information asymmetries, rational limit pricing may result from equilibrium behav-
ior. Entrants may be imperfectly informed about some aspects of incumbents’ opera-
tions such as marginal costs, coordination ability, or the existence of inimitable in-
puts. This in turn leads to uncertainty about prices, expected profits and post-entry
conditions [Masson and Shaanan, 1987]. Under these conditions the adoption of ratio-
nal limit pricing may enable incumbents to reduce the likelihood of entry. The deter-
rence models also demonstrate that with noise, the probability of entry can be an
increasing function of incumbents’ pricing. Given this feature and the fact that incum-
bents are uncertain about some aspects of the potential entrants’ operations and about
entry in general, their behavior is quite consistent with the description of incumbents
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[1971] and Baron [1973]. Therefore tests for stochastic-dynamic limit pricing can be
used to test rational limit pricing models [Masson and Shaanan, 1987; Gilbert 1989].
An additional issue that merits attention is the criticism aimed at cross-section
studies on this topic. The argument is that the estimates obtained are not consistent.
The criticism applies even when instrumental variables are introduced because the
instruments necessary for consistent estimation are rarely available [Schmalensee,
1989]. However, consistent estimation is possible in a recursive system [Schmalensee,
1989] and the present study employs a recursive model described below.
Entry in period t+1 is modeled as a function of incumbents’ actual price-cost mar-
gin (PCMa) minus a threshold price-cost margin (PCMT) below which entry will not
take place.
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PCMT is unobservable but it can be determined as a function of barriers to entry
and growth (G). Barriers to entry include the advertising-sales ratio (A) as a proxy for
product differentiation, minimum efficient scale (S) and capital requirements (K).
(2) PCM h A S K G t
T
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By inserting equation (2) into equation (1) the following function is obtained:
(3) Ei P C MA S K G tt
a
tt tt + =− 1 [( ( , , , )]
Price-cost margins and growth should induce entry whereas barriers to entry are
expected to have a negative impact. While equation (3) is fairly standard in the context
of entry deterrence models, alternative specifications are examined. An entry equa-
tion containing the adjusted price-cost margin, NPCMa, is also tested.
 (3a) Ej N P C M A S K G tt
a
tt tt + =− 1 [( ( , , , )]
Coefficient signs are expected to be the same as for equation (3).
The other part of the empirical model requires estimation of a performance equa-
tion. Debates over the correct measure of profitability are almost as numerous as
those on the competing hypotheses [See Scherer and Ross, 1990; and Martin, 1993].
As indicated above, the price-cost margin measure is presently adopted. This measure
has a theoretical rationale and has been used extensively in tests of the hypotheses.
Several specifications of PCMa are examined. The independent variables include con-
centration (C), barriers to entry, growth, and the capital-output ratio (KO), to account
for different levels of capital intensity. The equation tested is the following:23 RICARDIAN OR MONOPOLY RENTS?
(4) PCM q C A S K G KO t
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To account for the possible endogeneity of advertising and concentration, simulta-
neous equations are also tested. From equation (4) we obtain the partial derivative of
concentration  PCMC
a′ necessary to calculate NPCMa, where
NPCM PCM PCM C
aa
C
a =− ′ ∗ .
ESTIMATION AND DATA
Recalling the discussion from Model Section, the tests for MPH and EH focus on
the coefficients of PCMa and NPCMa in the entry equations.
To find in favor of MPH the following results are expected:
a) From equation (3), the partial derivative,  ′ > E
PCM
a 0.
b) From a J test (explained below), MPH should be accepted and EH either
accepted or rejected.
To find in favor of EH the following results are expected:
c) From equation (3a), the partial derivative,  ′ > E
NPCM
a 0.
d) From a J test, EH should be accepted and MPH either accepted or rejected.
A price-cost margin equation, based on equation (4), is estimated to obtain the
coefficient of concentration necessary to calculate NPCMa. Two entry equations, based
on equations (3) and (3a) are estimated to test whether PCMa and/or NPCMa are
positively correlated with entry. In order to accept one hypothesis and rule out the
alternative, additional testing is required. A comparison of coefficients is insufficient
for this purpose.11 Davidson and MacKinnon’s J test for nonnested equations is applied
to the entry equations. In the context of the J test, equation (5) below represents MPH
and equation (6) represents EH.
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The entry equations do not contain a concentration variable, therefore the two hy-
potheses can be regarded as nonnested and the J test is applied. To test H0 against H1,
equation (6) is estimated and the predicted value of its dependent variable (EHAT1) is
added as an explanatory variable to equation (5). After the new equation is estimated
we examine whether EHAT1 adds explanatory power to H0. If H0 is the “correct” model,
then EHAT1 should not be able to explain anything beyond that explained by the H0
model [Kennedy, 1998]. If H0 is rejected, that still does not enable one to conclude that
H1 should be accepted. To determine the adequacy of the other model, the roles of the
two hypotheses must be reversed and the test performed again. In this testing proce-
dure there is a good deal of flexibility. The tests yield four possible outcomes: a) Both
MPH and EH are acceptable. b) Neither is acceptable. c) MPH is acceptable but not
EH. d) EH is acceptable but not MPH [See Maddala, 1988; Davidson and Mackinnon,
1993].
An alternative approach, the errors in variables method, can also be used to test
the two hypotheses.
The possibility of simultaneity between entry and PCMa is dealt with by recogniz-
ing that the model is recursive. Entry takes place with a lag, i.e., Et+1 is determined by
the explanatory variables in period t. Therefore, the entry equation is recursively
identified given a condition on the error term and can be estimated by OLS.12 The
sample includes 39 U.S. manufacturing industries and is based on Harris’ [1973] study
which contains information on entry by market share in many major oligopolies.13
Such industries are well suited for testing the issue at hand. Following is a description
of the data employed:
Entry (E): The entry data consists of the market share of what Harris describes as
“substantial domestic entry” which occurred mainly during the 1958-1963 period. Most
of the entrants in the Harris sample were top 1000 Fortune firms as listed in Fortune’s
Plant and Product Directory. Other important entrants were obtained mainly from
Standard and Poors’ industry surveys and industry case studies. Harris examined
entry into 48 4-digit industries, all of which had previously appeared in industrial
organization studies.14 Entry by these Fortune 1000 firms consisted primarily of diver-
sification through the building of new capacity.15 It is interesting to note that roughly
half of the large capacity entrants in Harris’ sample were already producing in the
same 2-digit industry and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that they may have
had some knowledge about the target industry. There are several advantages in using
this entry data. If entry deterrence were to take place it would most likely occur in
oligopolistic industries. Additionally, if incumbents contemplate the adoption of an
entry deterrence strategy it would, in most cases, be aimed at large entrant firms
such as those included in the present sample. A gross entry measure based on market
share is preferable, in the context of entry deterrence models, to both net entry mea-
sures and entry measures based on the number of firms. The current measure also
excludes the numerous tiny entrant firms that have little impact on incumbents.
Price-Cost Margin (PCMa): The data is for 1958 and is obtained from Harris who
used Collins and Preston’s [1968] measures while supplementing his own estimates
for industries missing from their sample.
Concentration (C): The four firm concentration ratio is based on Shepherd’s [1970]
adjusted measure. Shepherd’s data which is for 1966 was further adjusted to 1958.25 RICARDIAN OR MONOPOLY RENTS?
Advertising/Sales (A): Harris used the IRS Corporation Source Book of Statistics
and Income as well as Advertising Age for 1954-1957.
Minimum Efficient Scale (S): The data is taken from Harris who defines the mini-
mum efficient scale as the average large plant size as a percentage of sales. Average
large plant size is the average size of the least number of plants accounting for two
thirds of industry output.
Capital Requirements (K): The data is taken from Harris and is defined as S times
industry book value for 1958.
Growth (G): Data for the pre-entry growth rate of sales is taken from Harris.
Capital/Output (KO): The data is obtained from Collins and Preston [1968]. The
ratio consists of gross book value divided by value of shipments.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
 E 1.97 3.68 0 15.0
PCMa 25.24 12.19 4.31 53.97
C 68.67 19.65 31.0 100.0
S 4.78 3.72 0.19 15.15
K 28.01 62.88 0.35 375.0
A 3.95 4.52 0.20 18.7
G 4.16 2.69 0.01 11.0
KO 47.03 34.15 9.02 152.6
Equation T.2.1, the first equation in Table 2, is an entry equation. Various diag-
nostics tests were applied to this equation. A Thursby and Schmidt [1977] specification
test does not indicate omitted variable bias and a White [1980] test shows no evidence
of heteroskedasticity. A Belsey, Kuh and Welsch [1980] test does not reveal any sub-
stantial outliers, none of the observations exceeds a critical level.16 The coefficient of
PCMa has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant. A one percentage
point increase in PCMa, results in a 0.177 percentage point increase in the market
share of large domestic entrants. This positive relation is consistent with the findings
of many entry studies, from different nations, where a gross entry measure was used
[See Siegfried and Evans, 1994). The proxy for product differentiation, A, appears to
have a strong deterrent effect, a one percentage point increase in A results in a 0.4
percentage point decline in the market share of entrants. The signs of other coeffi-
cients are in accordance with expectations although K and G are statistically insignifi-
cant. These results are similar to Masson and Shaanan’s [1982] findings.
Diagnostics tests were also applied to the PCMa equation, equation T.2.2, with
similar results. As expected, the coefficient of concentration has a positive and statis-
tically significant effect on price-cost margins. The interpretation of this result is that
a six percentage point increase in the four firm concentration ratio leads to approxi-
mately a one percentage point increase in PCMa. NPCMa is obtained by subtracting
0.171C from PCMa for each industry in the sample. The advertising sales ratio has a
strong positive and statistically significant impact on PCMa, a one percentage point
increase in A results in a 0.87 percentage point increase in PCMa. The minimum26 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
efficient scale variable has the expected sign and capital requirement has the wrong
sign, however, both variables are statistically insignificant. Growth results in slightly
more than a one percentage point increase in price-cost margins for a percentage
point increase in growth. The control variable KO, has the expected positive sign.
TABLE 2
Regression Resultsa
2.1. E = -0.648 + 0.177*PCMa - 0.413*A - 0.265*S - 0.006*K + 0.296*G
(0.44) (2.65) (2.42) (1.85) (0.74) (1.35)
R2   = 0.32
Adjusted R2 = 0.22
2.2. PCMa = -2.948 + 0.171*C + 1.87*A + 0.159*S - 0.013*K + 1.146*G + 0.083*KO
(0.63) (2.88) (6.76) (0.53) (0.73) (2.65) (2.32)
R2  = 0.73
Adjusted R2 = 0.68
2.3. E = 1.411 + 0.15*NPCMa - 0.355*A - 0.261*S - 0.005*K + 0.322*G
(1.12) (1.85) (1.89) (1.74) (0.60) (1.37)
R2  = 0.25
Adjusted R2 = 0.14
2.4. E = -0.46 + 0.339*PCMa - 1.38*EHAT1 - 0.84*A - 0.621*S - 0.015*K + 0.796*G
(0.31) (2.13) (1.12) (2.02) (1.78) (1.30) (1.60)
R2   = 0.35
Adjusted R2  =  0.22
2.5. E = -1.165 - 0.207*NPCMa + 1.917*EHAT0 + 0.442*A + 0.247*S + 0.003*K - 0.216*G
(0.68) (1.12) (2.13) (1.08) (0.89) (0.35) (0.64)
R2  = 0.35
Adjusted R2 = 0.22
a The numbers in parentheses are t values.  All regressions are based on 39 observations.
To test for recursive identification, the correlation between the error terms of the
entry and price-cost margin equations is examined. The results indicate that the error
terms are uncorrelated thus suggesting that the entry equation is recursively identi-
fied. The possibility of correlation between the explanatory variables and the error
term in each of the two equations is tested by applying the Hausman test. The results
do not permit a rejection of the null hypothesis that the error term and the explana-
tory variables are uncorrelated.17
Results for the entry equation containing NPCMa are presented in equation T.2.3.
The coefficient of NPCMa is statistically significant at the 10 percent level but is smaller
than the coefficient of PCMa in equation T.2.1. J test results are presented in equa-
tions T.2.4 and T.2.5. EHAT1 in equation T.2.4 is the fitted value of the entry equation
containing NPCMa. Most importantly for our current purpose the hypothesis that the
coefficient of EHAT1 is equal to zero cannot be rejected. Consequently H0 cannot be
rejected and the market power hypothesis is accepted. By reversing the above proce-
dure H1 is tested against H0 and equation T.2.5 presents the outcome of the test.
EHAT0, the fitted value of equation T.2.1, has a statistically significant coefficient and
adds explanatory power to the equation. Since the coefficient of EHAT0 does not equal27 RICARDIAN OR MONOPOLY RENTS?
zero, H1 and the efficiency hypothesis are rejected. In terms of the four options pre-
sented above, the finding is that MPH is acceptable but not EH.
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
To assess the robustness of the results alternative specifications were examined.
It has been suggested that the use of pre-entry profitability, as an indicator of poten-
tial entrants’ post entry profitability, assumes naive expectations on the part of poten-
tial entrants, or at the very least, the use of an incomplete information set [Highfield
and Smiley, 1987; Geroski, 1991]. Therefore, an alternative specification based on a
“rational expectations” measure of margins, PCMe
t+1, is tested.
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The left hand side of (7) represents subjective expectation while the right hand side
term is the objective expectation, conditional on the available data (It) at the time the
expectations (EXP) occurred [Maddala, 1988]. A proxy for PCMe
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from the predicted value of PCMa
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An entry equation was then estimated with the predicted value of PCMa
t+1. A PCMa
t+1
equation, equivalent to equation (4), was also estimated to obtain the coefficient of
concentration necessary for calculating NPCMa. Non-nested (J) tests were performed,
however, the results obtained with proxies for expected margins are very similar to
those reported in Table 2 with PCMa
t.
The concentration variable was replaced with the unadjusted Census concentra-
tion measure. This substitution results in a weaker concentration coefficient in the
PCMa equation — but the J test results remain basically unchanged — MPH is ac-
cepted while EH is rejected. Substituting profits on equity for PCMa yields the same
conclusion.
Switching from changes in variables to changes in estimation method, two other
estimation techniques were examined. A J test for a tobit estimation of entry provides
the same result as before, MPH is accepted and EH is rejected. There is support in the
literature for simultaneous estimation of PCMa, concentration and advertising. There-28 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
fore, two-stage least squares estimation was applied but the results remain unchanged
— MPH is accepted and EH is rejected.
A different specification, which represents a departure from the traditional barri-
ers to entry framework, was also tested. This model follows from the credible commit-
ment literature and both entry and PCMa are characterized as being functions of
tangible and intangible sunk costs.18   The entry equation also includes margins and
growth while the PCMa equation also includes concentration, growth and the capital-
output ratio. Once again J test results suggest an acceptance of MPH and a rejection
of EH.
An alternative testing method, the errors in variables approach, can also be used.
If we assume that from the perspective of potential entrants’ PCMa is mismeasured
because it includes Ricardian rents, then the coefficient of PCMa is biased downward
and the coefficient of NPCMa, the “correct” measure should be larger. However, a
comparison of the coefficients in equations T.2.1 and T.2.3 shows the opposite.
Finally, an exception to the above outcomes is obtained from a test based on a
non-linear concentration variable in the form of C and C2. In this case the J test
findings are that both MPH and EH are unacceptable.
To summarize, an examination of potential entrants’ behavior suggests that po-
tential entrants do not view the component of margins attributable to concentration
as Ricardian rents. Specifically, the explanatory power of the adjusted measure is
weaker than that of PCMa. J test results point to a rejection of the efficiency hypoth-
esis and, with one exception, an acceptance of the market power hypothesis. These
results are interesting in that they are obtained through the use of a different ap-
proach and are opposite to the results of many previous studies which found evidence
supportive of EH or for both EH and MPH.
If increased concentration, indeed, leads to higher prices, then proposals for relax-
ing or weakening antitrust laws may be inappropriate, especially, in the case of hori-
zontal mergers. However, the current results would have to be replicated before any
policy conclusions are applied.
NOTES
The author would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
1. This outcome is consistent with the Cournot model.
2. A more direct methodology, based on the use of a relative efficiency measure, is employed by
Martin [1988]. Martin’s findings support both hypotheses.
3. Salinger [1990] surveys this literature.
4. See also Shepherd [1986].
5. Lippman and Rumelt question positive associations between profitability and market share unless
uncertain imitability has been controlled or ruled out.
6. Montgomery and Wernerfelt [1988] describe the sources of Ricardian rents.
7. Masson and Shaanan [1982] note that if high actual profits reflect strictly superior efficiency, then
such profits should not attract entry.
8. The neo-classical idea that higher profits lead to entry is not unanimously accepted. In Lippman
and Rumelt’s [1982] model, interfirm heterogeneity in efficiency originates from stochastic, Gibrat
type, processes resulting from the uncertainty involved in the creation of new costs functions.
Such uncertainty, combined with either causal ambiguity or property rights in unique resources29 RICARDIAN OR MONOPOLY RENTS?
which impede imitation and factor mobility, results in uncertain imitability. Their model suggests
that high levels of profits can signal difficult to replicate levels of efficiency and deter rather than
induce entry.
9. Because entry does not usually respond to short-term profitability, the current test for EH would
also be a test for the disequilibrium profitability hypothesis.
10. Rational limit pricing models were presented by Milgrom and Roberts [1982], Saloner [1982],
Matthews and Mirman [1983], and Harrington [1984]. These models added rationality to potential
entrants’ behavior whereas previously it had been restricted to incumbents’ behavior.
11. The errors in variables approach is discussed below.
12. Tobit estimation is also examined.
13. Masson and Shaanan [1982] used a slightly smaller sample with 37 industries and a measure of
profits over equity.
14. Presently, only 39 industries are used either because the remaining industries are not manufac-
turing industries or else because of missing information for other variables employed.
15. In some cases entry also took place through branching out into a new product area in an existing
plant.
16. The critical level is based on Vellman and Welsch [1981].
17. Consequently, an instrumental variables approach is not required for estimating the entry and
price-cost margin equations.
18. Tangible sunk costs data are obtained from Waddell, Ritz, Norton and Wood [1966]. Advertising
costs are used to proxy intangible sunk costs.
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